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THE PENTAGON STILL CAN'T FIND BOSNIA
From Il Sabato (weekend magazine of Italy's La Repubblica), December 9, 1992
"We spare no effort against Iraq, but we let the Serbs get away with murder. That's why I left the State Department."
-- George Kenney
by Gian Gaspare Trotta
"I'm a very determined young man," laughs George Kenney, who until last August 25 was in charge of the State Department's Yugoslavian Desk. But despite his relative youth, the 35-year-old son of a career Foreign Service officer showed his mettle when he resigned his post in protest over the Bush Administration's inaction on Bosnia. This is his first interview with an Italian publication.
Q: Was there any one event that drove you to tender your resignation?
A: For months, I had been convinced that the administration was following the wrong path. We were only aggravating the situation with totally ineffectual acts. I tried to protest by giving as much information as possible about the tragedy that we had on our hands. I didn't think words along could have sufficed to describe the Serbs' actions; genocide is the only way to describe it. But this administration preferred to ignore the severity of the situation, obviously for a political calculation: They didn't see any interest in our intervening despite the fact people were dying there. That's why I decided to leave; it took about six to seven weeks to reach that decision. After that, it was just a question of waiting for when the announcement would get the most publicity, so I waited for the eve of the London Conference.
Q: How did your superiors react to your decision?
A: Some colleagues showed their support; I didn't talk directly to my ex-superiors, and thus can't speculate about their thoughts. I tried to make a clean break; I sent the Department a brief letter of resignation describing my objections to their position. I did receive -- and I'm very glad of the fact -- expressions of support and esteem from many former State Department officials, including some former ambassadors.
Q: Queried by journalists in London, Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said he "understood" the motives behind your resignation...
A: In the comments I read, Eagleburger never responded to my criticism. They're the top level of the department, they decided differently, and that's just all there is to it. They can't give true answers.
Q: Have you seen any change in the U.S. position as a result of your resignation?
A: I think it will take some time. It had an effect internally, but I can only hope for more tangible results in time. The situation in Bosnia is truly serious and requires urgent attention. We can't wait for more months of negotiation, because there are hundreds of thousands of life in danger. We have a moral obligation.
Q: On the eve of the London Conference, you were skeptical about its success. Once it ended, did your opinion change?
A: No. I thought the underlying rationale was mistaken. The Conference didn't support effective means of forcing the Serbs to follow the UN resolutions. They basically said, "Let's keep negotiating, and turn up the economic sanctions.” But these aren't real constraints; the only thing that can convince the Serbs is the use of military force. From their point of view, the Conference encouraged them to finish the job. The Conference's participants deluded themselves into thinking the Serbs were amenable to rational diplomacy. But it's an illusion; a case of appeasement like in the Thirties with the Nazis. The Serbs will only stop when they've reached their objective, which is to dominate Bosnia.
Q: You suggest that U.S. should resort to air attacks to destroy the Serbs' heavy weapons. And at the same time, you want to provide arms to the Bosnians. How technically feasible are these options?
A: I think that both are very feasible. It's not possible to destroy all the Serbs' heavy weapons, but we can destroy the majority of those emplaced around the major cities in Bosnia, such as Sarajevo, Gorazde, Tuvla and others. That way, the Bosnians might be in shape to break the sieges and gain back their territory. I think we have a valid justification for helping the Bosnian government, which has already requested our help in getting arms. The Bosnians are terribly unprepared to confront the Serbs militarily; the UN embargo keeps them from getting sufficient arms, while the Serbs can get any weapons they desire. It's a very lopsided struggle.
Q: Did you draw up any plans of the sort while you were still at the State Department?
A: I can't give details of any plans of this sort.
Q: Has the deployment of so many U.S. and allied aircraft to enforce the "No-Fly Zone" in Iraq ruled out such military options in the Balkans?
A: President Bush has spoken about the principles of liberty, democracy, etc., in relation to Iraq. But these same principles are at stake in the Balkans. We can very easily deploy an aerial shield over the Balkans; there aren't any objections to doing it. Serbian aircraft are attacking civilian targets in Bosnia, and I think they are using napalm. We could stop them very easily and effectively. And we could do it very quickly.
Q: What do you think of reports that the Bosnian Muslims are committing massacres against their own people to attract world sympathy?
A: Even if there was a grain of truth in these reports, the vast majority of them are not based on real facts, and I find it offensive that people who should be better informed have tried to pass this off as true. All of that is very unjust.
Q: UN envoy Tadeusz Mazowiecki concluded in his report that clearly cites acts of genocide. Is it possible the UN could take a harder line as a result?
A: That would be a good thing, but there's a big difference between issuing reports and taking effective action. We've had a lot of declarations, like UN Resolution 757 and others; they're not of any use at this point.
Q: Turning back to the U.S., how hard would it be to invoke the Genocide Convention on behalf of the Bosnians? Are any members of Congress pushing for this?
A: I don't think many members of Congress are active in this field. There are six total in the Senate, and I don't know how many in the House of Representatives. The U.S. is a signatory to the Genocide Convention. It would be very simple to declare that the situation described in the Convention existed in Bosnia. But they don't do it, because it would then require a very strong action.
Q: Where will the next Bosnia occur?
A: If the U.S. doesn't set a good precedent in this case, things will only get worse. Kosovo and Macedonia are other high-risk situations; they could explode from one minute to the next. Maybe when it becomes apparent how disastrous our position in ex-Yugoslavia is, there will be a change in political sentiment here, possibly before the next Congressional elections. At least I hope so.
Q: Does the U.S. government have a plan to accept Bosnian refugees?
A: The U.S. government has said it will not accept refugees from Bosnia, and in my opinion, they will not change their position.
Q: Where will these people end up? Will they head for Italy?
A: Obviously, they can't stay where they are -- if they want to remain alive. Inevitably, they'll seek to escape to other countries, most likely Austria and Germany and then Italy.
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